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Abstract
For a risk vector V , whose components are shared among agents by some random mecha-
nism, we obtain asymptotic lower and upper bounds for the individual agents’ exposure risk
and the aggregated risk in the market. Risk is measured by Value-at-Risk or Conditional
Tail Expectation. We assume Pareto tails for the components of V and arbitrary dependence
structure in a multivariate regular variation setting. Upper and lower bounds are given by
asymptotically independent and fully dependent components of V with respect to the tail
index α being smaller or larger than 1. Counterexamples, where for non-linear aggregation
functions no bounds are available, complete the picture.
AMS 2010 Subject Classifications: primary: 90B15, 91B30 secondary: 60E05, 60G70
Keywords: multivariate regular variation, individual and systemic risk, Pareto tail, risk measure,
bounds for aggregated risk, random risk sharing
1 Introduction
Let Vj for j = 1, . . . , d be risk variables having Pareto-tails, so that, for possibly different Kj > 0
and tail index α > 0,
P (Vj > t) ∼Kjt−α, t→∞. (1.1)
(For two functions f and g we write f(t) ∼ g(t) as t→∞ if limt→∞ f(t)/g(t) = 1.) We summarize
all risk variables in a vector V = (V1, . . . , Vd)⊺. The tail index α is assumed to be the same for all
j = 1, . . . , d since, when aggregating risk factors with different tail indexes, always the smallest α
wins as a famous result of [5] states. That said, assuming the same α practically means to choose
the subset with the smallest α out of a set of risk factors resulting in a dimension reduction.
The d risks in V are shared among q agents by some random mechanism. Let Fi denote the
exposure of agent i and F = (F1, . . . , Fq)⊺ the exposure vector. The risk sharing is governed by
a random q × d matrix A = (Aij)q,di,j=1 (independent of V ) in such a way that Fi = ∑dj=1AijVj for
i = 1, . . . , q or, eqivalently, in matrix notation
F = AV. (1.2)
Whether A is deterministic or stochastic may depend on the quality of available information. An
internal analyst or regulator with sufficient knowledge may consider A as deterministic, whereas
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an external analyst (working for an institutional investor for instance) may consider it random
due to lack of insight. This note is motivated by [13] and [14], where the risk variables Vj model
large insurance claims and agents represent reinsurance companies. The claims can for instance
be shared randomly with a mechanism given by a bipartite graph structure, resulting in
Aij =
1(i ∼ j)
deg(j)
, (1.3)
where 1(i ∼ j) indicates whether agent i takes a (proportional) share of risk j or not, and deg(j)
denotes the total number of agents who have chosen to insure risk j. Further examples include
operational risk, modelling event types (risk variables) and business lines (agents), where Pareto
tails are natural (cf. [4]), and also overlapping portfolios (common asset holding) as described
in [7].
In all these applications it is of interest to quantify not only the risk of single agents, but
also the market risk—saying that we mean the aggregated risk in the market—which is of high
relevance to the regulator. Following ideas in [8] we assess the market risk by a risk measure on
the r-norm (r ≥ 1) or r−quasinorm (0 < r < 1) ∥F ∥ ∶= ∥F ∥r = (∑qi=1 F ri )1/r of the exposure vector
F . These aggregation functions satisfy most of the required axioms in [8] and are continuous as
well as convex or concave, respectively. Our market risk measures do not necessarily satisfy the
normalization condition required there: Assuming a total unit loss split to equal parts among
the agents, we have ∥(1/q, . . . ,1/q)∥r = q1/r−1 < 1 if r > 1 and ∥(1/q, . . . ,1/q)∥r = q1/r−1 > 1 for
0 < r < 1, hence, the normalization condition of [8] is satisfied only if r = 1. In the first case we see
that the r−norm underestimates the additive risk by convexity. In particular, if the number of
agents increases, the loss measured by the r−norm decreases. As a consequence, norms with r > 1
are not suitable for systemic risk assessment as they imply hereby the possibility of regulatory
arbitrage. We argue, however, that this underestimation may be realistic in some applications
as a larger market may be less risky due to a balance of risk as is well-known for insurance
portfolios. Moreover, norms of that type can be useful in portfolio analysis, see [6]. In the second
case 0 < r < 1 the r−quasinorm will overestimate the additive risk. This situation in turn may be
realistic whenever amplification mechanisms come into play as it happens with systemic risk. In
addition, [11] employ r−quasinorms for portfolio construction. Our framework allows for great
variability concerning the choice of the aggregation function: convex, linear or concave. The
decision which aggregation function to employ is in the end application-driven and mostly a
decision based on economic reasoning.
We investigate risk based on the Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Conditional Tail Expectation
(CoTE), which we assess by asymptotic approximations.
Let Vind, V,Vdep be risk vectors as above with different dependence structures among the risk
variables. Here Vind corresponds to asymptotically independent variables and Vdep to asymptot-
ically fully dependent variables in the framework of multivariate regular variation as in [14].
As in the copula world (see [3, 10]) it is possible to assess the two extreme dependence
structures; i.e., Vind, Vdep, and it is of high relevance to understand, if or under which conditions
these extreme dependences lead to upper and lower bounds of risk for arbitrary dependence
structures. Remarkably, [10] show that the comonotonic copula does not lead to an upper bound,
and a procedure is provided there to find the best possible upper VaR bound. In [3], information
on variance is added. This reduces the set of feasible copulas. Then the upper bound can be lower
than the comonotic VaR. The related problem of sub- and super-addtivity has been investigated
in [9]. We extend the setting and scope in [9] significantly: first, by allowing for diversity in the
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tails as in (1.1) and, second, by incorporating a stochastic market structure as in (1.2) allowing
for risk assesment in a much wider way. Moreover, the results in [9] are also formulated for
general aggregation functions but the effect of non-linearity—hence the possible breakdown of
general bounds—is not considered there. In that sense, our results add new important aspects
to the existing literature.
This note is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present V as a regularly varying vector
with different dependence structures. Here we also define the risk measures VaR and CoTE
for arbitrary random variables, and summarize their asymptotic behaviour in our framework. In
Section 3 we derive bounds for single agent and market risk based on asymptotically independent
and fully dependent random variables. We also give counter examples to present the limitations
of the bounds.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Multivariate regular variation
We recall from [17], Ch. 6 that the positive random vector V ∈ Rd
+
is multivariate regularly
varying if there is a Radon measure ν /≡ 0 on the Borel σ-algebra B = B(Rd
+
∖ {0}), where 0
denotes the zero vector in Rd, such that
nP [n−1/αV ∈ ⋅] v→ ν(⋅), n→∞. (2.1)
The symbol
v→ stands for vague convergence. Moreover, the measure ν is homogeneous of some
order −α with α > 0 and is called the exponent measure of V .
We fix a norm ∥⋅∥ on Rd in such a way that for all canonical unit vectors ∥ej∥ = 1, j = 1, . . . , d.
This actually entails a slight abuse of notation as we also write ∥ ⋅ ∥ for the aggregation function
of the vector F of agent exposures on Rq. Denoting by Sd−1
+
= {x ∈ Rd
+
∶ ∥x∥ = 1} the positive
sphere in Rd , the existence of the exponent measure ν is equivalent to the existence of a Radon
measure ρ /≡ 0 on the Borel σ-algebra B(Sd−1
+
) in such a way that for all u > 0
P [∥V ∥ > ut,V ∥V ∥−1 ∈ ⋅]
P [∥V ∥ > t] v→ u−αρ(⋅), t→∞, (2.2)
holds. The measure ρ is called the spectral measure of V . The precise relation between ν and ρ
can be found in [17], Ch. 6.
Finally, we note that convergence in (2.1) also implies
P [t−1V ∈ ⋅]
P [∥V ∥ > t] v→
ν(⋅)
ν({x ∶ ∥x∥ > 1}) , t →∞. (2.3)
The tail index α > 0 is also called the index of regular variation of V , and we write V ∈R(−α).
We shall often work with the so-called canonical exponent measure ν∗ of V , which is defined
as the image measure ν∗ = ν ○ T under the transformation mapping T ∶ Rd
+
→ Rd
+
, given by
T (x) = (ν({x1 > 1})1/αx1/α1 , . . . , ν({xd > 1})1/αx1/αd )⊺.
Then ν∗ has standardized margins and a tail index 1, corresponding to P (Vj > x) ∼ x−1 as
x→∞.
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The corresponding spectral measure ρ∗ is called the canonical spectral measure and is char-
acterized by
∫
S
d−1
+
sjρ
∗(ds) = 1, j = 1, . . . , d, (2.4)
see [2], p. 259.
For the matrix A and a given norm ∥ ⋅ ∥, which gives rise to an operator norm
∥A∥op = sup
∥x∥=1
∥Ax∥,
we require througout the following:
• A satisfies the moment condition E∥A∥α+δop <∞ for some δ > 0 and α as in (1.1);
• the vector V is independent of the random matrix A, while V1, . . . , Vd may not be inde-
pendent of each other.
If both conditions hold, then the vector F = AV is again regularly varying with exponent measure
Eν ○A−1 (cf. [1], Proposition A.1).
2.2 Risk measures
We also recall the following risk measures.
Definition 2.1. The Value-at-Risk (VaR) of a random variable X at confidence level 1 − γ is
defined as
VaR1−γ(X) ∶= inf{t ≥ 0 ∶ P [X > t] ≤ γ}, γ ∈ (0,1),
and the Conditional Tail Expectation (CoTE) at confidence level 1−γ, based on the corresponding
VaR, as
CoTE1−γ(X) ∶= E[X ∣ X > VaR1−γ(X)], γ ∈ (0,1).
◻
Throughout the following constants will be relevant
Ciind =
d
∑
j=1
KjEA
α
ij, i = 1, . . . , q, and C
S
ind =
d
∑
j=1
KjE∥Aej∥α, (2.5)
Cidep = E(AK1/α1)αi , i = 1, . . . , q, and CSdep = E∥AK1/α1∥α, (2.6)
where we summarize the constants Kj for j = 1, . . . , d from (1.1) in a diagonal matrix
K1/α ∶= diag(K1/α1 , . . . ,K1/αd ). (2.7)
Lemma 2.2 ([14], Corollaries 3.7 and 3.8). Let F = AV = (F1, . . . , Fq)⊺.
(a) Individual risk measures:
For α > 0 the individual Value–at–Risk of agent i ∈ {1, . . . , q} satisfies
VaR1−γ(Fi) ∼ C1/αγ−1/α, γ → 0. (2.8)
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For α > 1 the individual Conditional Tail Expectation of agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} satisfies
CoTE1−γ(Fi) ∼ α
α − 1VaR1−γ(Fi) ∼
α
α − 1C
1/αγ−1/α , γ → 0.
The individual constants are either C = Ciind or C = C
i
dep for V1, . . . , Vd asymptotically indepen-
dent or asymptotically fully dependent, respectively.
(b) Market risk measures:
The market Value–at–Risk of the aggregated vector ∥F ∥ satisfies
VaR1−γ(∥F ∥) ∼ C1/αγ−1/α, γ → 0. (2.9)
If α > 1 the market Conditional Tail Expectation of the aggregated vector ∥F ∥ satisfies
CoTE1−γ(∥F ∥) ∼ α
α − 1VaR1−γ(∥F ∥) ∼
α
α − 1C
1/αγ−1/α , γ → 0.
The market constants referring to the system setting are either C = CSind or C = C
S
dep for
V1, . . . , Vd asymptotically independent or asymptotically fully dependent, respectively.
3 Bounds for general dependence structure
Recall from (3.12) and (3.14) of [14] that the constants (2.5) can be expressed in terms of the
exponent measure via
Ciind = Eνind ○A−1({x ∶ xi > 1}), i = 1, . . . , q, and CSind = Eνind ○A−1({x ∶ ∥x∥ > 1}) (3.1)
Cidep = Eνdep ○A−1({x ∶ xi > 1}), i = 1, . . . , q, and CSdep = Eνdep ○A−1({x ∶ ∥x∥ > 1∣}) (3.2)
with (cf. Lemma 2.2 of [14])
νind([0, x]c) = d∑
j=1
Kjx
−α
j and νdep([0, x]c) = max
j=1,...,d
{Kjx−αj }. (3.3)
The analogues of the constants Ciind, C
i
dep as well as C
S
ind and C
S
dep in the case of an arbitrary
extremal dependence structure of the vector V , represented by some exponent measure ν with
νind ≠ ν ≠ νdep, are then
Ciν = Eν ○A−1({x ∶ xi > t}) and CSν = Eν ○A−1({x ∶ ∥x∥ > t}). (3.4)
In the light of Lemma 2.2 it suffices to determine bounds for the constants Ciν and C
S
ν in order
to obtain asymptotic bounds for VaR or CoTE in the respective cases.
With K1/α from (2.7), for the exponent measure ν of the vector V with any dependence
structure, we obtain
CSν = Eν ○K1/α ○ (AK1/α)−1({∥x∥ > 1}) and Ciν = Eν ○K1/α ○ (AK1/α)−1({xi > 1}).
Note that the measure ν ○K1/α has balanced tails; i.e., ν ○K1/α({xj > 1}) = 1, j = 1, . . . , d. Since
all marginal random variables are as in (1.1), regardless of the dependence structure of the vector
V , for the proofs of all theorems below we can and do assume that margins are standardized;
e.g. Kj = 1 for j = 1, . . . , d. Moreover, for establishing inequalities between Ciind,C
i
dep and C
i
ν
or CSind,C
S
dep and C
S
ν , respectively, it is sufficient to prove the corresponding inequalities for all
realizations of the random matrix A. We obtain the following bounds for the constants defining
the individual risk measures.
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Theorem 3.1. Let the three d-dimensional vectors Vind, V and Vdep be given with equal margins
V1, . . . , Vd with P [Vj > t] ∼ Kjt−α, but different exponent measures νind, ν, νdep. Then for the
constants Ci referring to agent i the following inequalities hold:
Ciind ≤ C
i
ν ≤ C
i
dep forα ≥ 1, (3.5)
Cidep ≤ C
i
ν ≤ C
i
ind forα < 1. (3.6)
Proof. Let ai ∶= Ai⋅ be the i-th row of the matrix A and Vind, V,Vdep be as above the risk vectors
with different dependence structures. Corollary 3.8 in [16] provides for α ≥ 1 the inequalities
lim sup
t→∞
P [aiVind > t]
P [aiV ] ≤ 1 and lim supt→∞
P [aiV > t]
P [aiVdep > t] ≤ 1 (3.7)
and for 0 < α < 1 the inequalities
lim sup
t→∞
P [aiVdep > t]
P [aiV > t] ≤ 1 and lim supt→∞
P [aiV > t]
P [aiVind > t] ≤ 1.
Regarding the left inequality in (3.7), we have
lim sup
t→∞
P [aiVind > t]
P [aiV > t] = lim supt→∞
P [aiVind > t]
P [∥Vind∥ > t]
P [∥Vind∥ > t]
P [Vind,i > t] /
P [aiV > t]
P [∥V ∥ > t]
P [∥V ∥ > t]
P [Vi] > t
=
νind ○A−1({xi > t})ν({xi > 1})
ν ○A−1({xi > t})νind({xi > 1}) =
νind ○A−1({xi > 1})
ν ○A−1({xi > 1}) ≤ 1, (3.8)
since w.l.o.g all marginals are the same. The other inequalities in (3.5) as well as in (3.6) are
treated analogously.
For bounds on the market risk measures we invoke ideas from [16]. Below we sometimes write
Ciν(A) and CSν (A) instead of Ciν and CSν , if we want to emphasize that the constants depend on
a particular matrix A.
Theorem 3.2. Let the three d-dimensional vectors Vind, V and Vdep be given with equal mar-
gins V1, . . . , Vd with P [Vj > t] ∼ Kjt−α, but different exponent measures νind, ν, νdep. Denote the
aggregated vector ∥F ∥ for some r-norm for r ≥ 1 or r-quasinorm for 0 < r < 1, representing the
risk in the market.
(a) If r ≥ 1, for the constants CS referring to the system setting risk the following inequalities
hold:
CSν ≥ C
S
ind for α ≥ r, (3.9)
CSν ≤ C
S
ind for 0 < α ≤ 1. (3.10)
(b) If 0 < r < 1, for the constants CS referring to the system setting the following inequalities
hold:
CSν ≥ C
S
ind for α ≥ 1, (3.11)
CSν ≤ C
S
ind for 0 < α ≤ r. (3.12)
(c) However, there are matrices A1,A2 and an exponent measure ν0 such that
CSind(A1) > CSν0(A1) for 1 < α < r, (3.13)
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CSν0(A2) > CSind(A2) for 1 < α < r, (3.14)
CSind(A1) < CSν0(A1) for r < α < 1, (3.15)
CSν0(A2) < CSind(A2) for r < α < 1, (3.16)
Proof. (a) In analogy to [16] we define for s1/α ∶= (s1/α1 , . . . , s1/αd )
gA,α(s) ∶= ∥As1/α∥α and ρ∗gA,α ∶= ∫
Sd−1
+
gA,α(s)ρ∗(ds)
for some canonical spectral measure ρ∗. Similar to (3.8), we note that
νind ○A−1({∥x∥ > 1})
ν ○A−1({∥x∥ > 1}) = limt→∞
P [∥AVind∥ > t]
P [∥AV ∥ > t] . (3.17)
Furthermore, we get from Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 in [16] that
lim
t→∞
P [∥AVind∥ > t]
P [∥AV ∥ > t] =
ρ∗indgA,α
ρ∗gA,α
(3.18)
holds. Hence, in order to prove (3.9) and (3.10) it is sufficient to show that ρ∗ind(gA,α) ≤ ρ∗(gA,α)
and ρ∗ind(gA,α) ≥ ρ∗(gA,α), respectively.
We first show (3.9). Note that for nonnegative real numbers a1, . . . , an and β ≥ 1 the inequality
a
β
1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + aβn ≤ (a1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + an)β (3.19)
is valid. Since ρ∗indgA,α = ∑dj=1 ∥Aej∥α, and using (2.4), we write as in the proof of Theorem 3.7
of [16]
ρ∗indgA,α = ∫
Sd−1
+
d
∑
j=1
∥Aej∥αsjρ∗(ds) = ∫
Sd−1
+
∑dj=1 ∥As1/αj ej∥α
∥∑dj=1As1/αj ej∥α ∥As
1/α∥αρ∗(ds).
In order to establish ρ∗indgA,α ≤ ρ
∗gA,α it is sufficient to bound the fraction under the right hand
integral by one. For this, we recall that all the entries in A are nonnegative and that α
r
≥ 1. We
compute
d
∑
j=1
∥As1/αj ej∥α = d∑
j=1
( q∑
i=1
(aijs1/αj )r)
α
r ≤ ( d∑
j=1
q
∑
i=1
(aijs1/αj )r)
α
r
(3.20)
≤ ( q∑
i=1
( d∑
j=1
aijs
1/α
j )r)
α
r
(3.21)
= ∥ d∑
j=1
As
1/α
j ej∥α
where we have applied inequality (3.19) twice.
For the bound (3.10) we use the cr−inequality, see e.g. [15], p. 157, leading to
∥ n∑
i=1
xi∥α ≤ ( n∑
i=1
∥xi∥)α ≤ n∑
i=1
∥xi∥α (3.22)
for x1, . . . , xn ∈ Rd. In particular,
ρ∗indgA,α =
d
∑
j=1
∥Aej∥α = ∫
Sd−1
+
d
∑
j=1
∥Aej∥αsjdρ∗(s)
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= ∫
Sd−1
+
gA,α(s)∑
d
j=1 ∥As1/αj ej∥α∥As1/α∥α dρ∗(s) ≥ ρ∗gA,α
leading to
CSν = ν ○A−1({∥x∥ > 1}) ≤ νind ○A−1({∥x∥ > 1}) = CSind
as expressed in (3.10).
(b) We can proceed analogously to the proof of part (a), simply reversing inequalities. In order
to establish (3.12), we note that inequality (3.19) holds in a reverse way for β ≤ 1. Consequently,
also both inequalities (3.20) and (3.21) hold analogously in the opposite way. For (3.11), note
that in the case of α ≥ 1 and 0 < r < 1 both inequalities in (3.22) obviously hold in a reverse way.
(c) Concerning examples for (3.13) and (3.14), we choose ν0 to be the image measure ν0 ∶=
νind ○B−1 with standard exponent measure νind on R3+ given as usual by νind([0, x]c) = ∑3j=1 x−αj
and a matrix
B = (1 1 0
1 0 1
) .
Furthermore, we define the function T ∶ R2
+
→ R2
+
as
T (x) = ((ν0({y ∈ R2+ ∶ ∣y1∣ > 1})x1)1/α, (ν0({y ∈ R2+ ∶ ∣y2∣ > 1})x2)1/α)⊺.
The measure ν∗0 = ν0 ○ T is then canonical; i.e., it is homogeneous of order −1 and ν∗0 ({y ∈ R2+ ∶∣yi∣ > 1}) = 1 for i = 1,2. To get the canonical spectral measure, we conduct the transformation to
polar coordinates by setting τ(x) = (∥x∥, x∥x∥). Denoting by ρ∗0 the spectral measure and defining
the measure pi by dpi(x) = x−2dx, the relation ν∗0 = pi ⊗ ρ∗1 holds. We can now calculate ρ∗0 as
follows. We first note that by construction ν0 and hence ν
∗
0 only have positive mass on the
axes as well as on the diagonal {t1 ∶ t > 0}. Therefore, the canonical spectral measure, living
on the sphere Sd
+
, only attains mass at the points (1,0)⊺, (0,1)⊺,1/∥1∥. We first observe that
ν0 ○B−1({x ∶ ∣xi∣ > 1}) = 2 for i = 1,2. This yields
ρ∗0({(1,0)⊺}) = ν0 ○ T ({te1∣ t > 1})
= νind ○B−1({21/αtej ∣ t > 1})
= νind(x ∈ R3+∣ Bx ∈ {21/αte1 ∈ R2+∣ t > 1})
= νind(se2 ∈ R3+∣ sBe2 ∈ {21/αte1 ∈ R2+∣ t > 1})
= νind(se2 ∈ R3+∣ s ∈ [21/α,∞)) = 12 = ρ∗0({(0,1)⊺})
by symmetry. For the third atom we calculate
ρ∗0({1/∥1∥}) = ν0 ○ T ({t1/∥1∥∣ t > 1})
= νind ○B−1({21/αt1/∥1∥1/α∣ t > 1})
= νind(x ∈ R3+∣ Bx ∈ {21/αt1/∥1∥1/α ∈ R2+∣ t > 1})
= νind(se1 ∈ R3+∣sBe1 ∈ {(2/∥1∥)1/αt1 ∈ R2+∣ t > 1})
= νind(se1 ∈ R3+∣ s ∈ [(2/∥1∥)1/α,∞)) = ∥1∥2 .
Consequently, we have
ρ∗0 =
1
2
δ(1,0)⊺ + 1
2
δ(0,1)⊺ + ∥1∥
2
δ1/∥1∥.
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Furthermore, the canonical spectral measures for the case of asymptotical independence and full
dependence are
ρ∗ind = δ(1,0)⊺ + δ(0,1)⊺ and ρ∗dep = ∥1∥δ1/∥1∥
In order to construct counterexamples we choose d = q = 2 and the function gA1,α with A1 = I2
the identity matrix. Then
ρ∗0gA1,α = ∫
S1
+
∥A1s1/α∥αdρ∗0
= ∥I2(1,0)⊺∥αρ∗1({(1,0)⊺}) + ∥I2(0,1)⊺∥αρ∗1({(0,1)⊺}) + ∥I2(1/∥1∥)1/α∥αρ∗1({1/∥1∥})
= 2−1 + 2−1 + ∥1∥−1∥(1,1)⊺∥α ∥1∥
2
= 1 + 2αr −1,
while ρ∗indgA1,α = 2. This leads to the equivalences
ρ∗0gA1,α < ρindgA1,α ⇔ 2 > 1 + 2αr −1 ⇔ 1 > 2αr −1 ⇔ r > α. (3.23)
In particular, we have for 1 < α < r,
CSν0(A1) < CSind(A1).
Next, we choose A2 = (1 1
1 1
) and calculate
ρ∗indgA2,α = ∥1∥α + ∥1∥α = 2αr +1
as well as
ρ∗0gA2,α =
1
2
∥1∥α + 1
2
∥1∥α + ∥1∥
2
∥(1 1
1 1
) 1∥1∥1/α ∥
α
.
Consequently,
ρ∗indgA2,α < ρ
∗
0gA2,α ⇔ 2 < 2α (3.24)
Therefore, for α > 1, CSind(A2) < CSν0(A2). Inequalities (3.15) and (3.16) follow then from (3.23)
and (3.24), respectively.
Theorem 3.3. Let the three d-dimensional vectors Vind, V and Vdep be given with equal mar-
gins V1, . . . , Vd with P [Vj > t] ∼ Kjt−α, but different exponent measures νind, ν, νdep. Denote the
aggregated vector ∥F ∥ for some r-norm for r > 1 or some r-quasinorm for 0 < r < 1, representing
the risk in the market.
(a) If r ≥ 1, for the constants CS referring to the system setting the following inequalities hold:
CSν ≤ C
S
dep for α ≥ r (3.25)
CSν ≥ C
S
dep for 0 < α ≤ 1 (3.26)
(b) If 0 < r < 1, for the constants CS referring to the system setting the following inequalities
hold:
CSν ≤ C
S
dep for α ≥ 1 (3.27)
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CSν ≥ C
S
dep for 0 < α ≤ r (3.28)
(c) However, there are matrices A1,A2 and an exponent measure ν0 such that
CSν0(A1) > CSdep(A1) for 1 < α < r, (3.29)
CSdep(A2) > CSν0(A2) for 1 < α < r, (3.30)
CSν0(A1) < CSdep(A1) for r < α < 1, (3.31)
CSdep(A2) < CSν0(A2) for r < α < 1. (3.32)
Proof. We need the following inequalities, which are known as generalizations of Theorem 202
in [12], where such inequalities are proved for integrals with respect to Lebesgue measures. The
general versions below are natural extensions using Fubini’s theorem and the Ho¨lder inequality
for σ-finite measures. Suppose (S1, µ1), (S2, µ2) are two σ-finite measure spaces and F ∶ S1×S2 →
R is a product-measurable mapping. Then for p ≥ 1 the inequality
∫
S2
∣∫
S1
F (x, y)dµ1(x)∣p dµ2(y) ≤ ⎛⎝∫S1 (∫S2 ∣F (x, y)∣pdµ2(x))
1
p
dµ1
⎞
⎠
p
(3.33)
and for 0 < p ≤ 1 the inequality
∫
S2
∣∫
S1
F (x, y)dµ1(x)∣p dµ2(y) ≥ ⎛⎝∫S1 (∫S2 ∣F (x, y)∣pdµ2(x))
1
p
dµ1
⎞
⎠
p
(3.34)
hold true.
(a) In the case 1 < r < α we want to show (3.25); more precisely,
∫
Sd−1
+
∥As1/α∥αdρ∗(s) ≤ ∫
Sd−1
+
∥As1/α∥αdρ∗dep(s) = ∥A1∥α. (3.35)
To this end, we will apply (3.33) twice. In a first step, take S2 = Sd−1+ with µ2 = ρ and S1 ={1, . . . , q} with µ1 the counting measure, as well as F (i, s) = (∑dj=1Aijs1/αj )r and p = αr . Then
∫
Sd−1
+
∥As1/α∥αdρ∗(s) = ∫
S2
∣∫
S1
F (x, y)dµ1(x)∣p dµ2(y)
≤ (∫
S1
(∫
S2
∣F (x, y)∣pdµ2(x)) 1p dµ1)p
= ( q∑
i=1
(∫
Sd−1
+
( d∑
j=1
Aijs
1/α
j )r
α
r
dρ∗(s)) rα )αr (3.36)
In the second step, take S2 = Sd−1+ with µ2 = ρ
∗ and S1 = {1, . . . , d} with the weighted counting
measure µi1 = ∑dj=1Aijδj for i = 1, . . . , q. Further, let F (j, s) = s1/αj and p = α. Then
∫
Sd−1
+
( d∑
j=1
Aijs
1/α
j )αdρ∗(s) ≤ ( d∑
j=1
Aij(∫
Sd−1
+
(s1/αj )αdρ∗(s))1/α)α = ( d∑
j=1
Aij)α, i = 1, . . . , q.
We continue with (3.36) and find that
( q∑
i=1
(∫
S
d−1
+
( d∑
j=1
Aijs
1/α
j )r
α
r
dρ∗(s)) rα )αr ≤ ( q∑
i=1
(( d∑
j=1
Aij)α) rα )αr = ∥A1∥α.
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Relation (3.26) is shown analogously using (3.34).
(b) Inequalities (3.27) and (3.28) can be shown similar to part (a) by using the respective
reverse inequalities.
(c) Finally, we can use ρ∗0 in order to show (3.29) and (3.30). Taking again A1 = I2, we obtain
ρ∗0gA1,α = 1 + 2
α
r
−1 and ρ∗depgA1,α = 2
α
r
and, consequently,
ρ∗0gA1,α > ρ
∗
depgA1,α ⇔ 1 + 2αr −1 > 2αr ⇔ 2 > 2αr ⇔ α < r. (3.37)
Therefore, we have CSν0(A1) > CSdep(A1) for 1 < α < r.
Next, we choose A2 ∶= (1 1
1 1
) and compute
ρ∗1gA2,α = 2
α
r + 2−12α(1+ 1r ) and ρ∗depgA2,α = 2α(1+
1
r
).
As a matter of fact,
ρ∗depgA2,α > ρ
∗
1gA2,α ⇔ 2α > 2⇔ α > 1; (3.38)
i.e., we have CSν0(A2) < CSdep for 1 < α < r. Relations (3.31) and (3.32) then follow from (3.37)
and (3.38), respectively.
Corollary 3.4. Given the assumptions of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, respectively, in the particular
case α = r = 1 the equalities
CSind = C
S
dep = C
S
ν
hold true; i.e., the Value-at-Risk asymptotics are not influenced by the dependence structure
between the risk factors.
Remark 3.5. Considering asymptotic bounds for the VaR1−γ and the CoTE1−γ as in this paper
can be of practical relevance since γ is typically taken to be small. Bounds for tail risk measures
have also been studied in [3] in a non-asymptotic setting. From these bounds, one can derive
asymptotic versions. As an example consider the upper bounds, while setting q = d and A = Id
(the identity matrix, which is in particular deterministic) as well as α ∈ (1,∞) and ∥ ⋅ ∥1 as the
norm. Then Theorem 3.3 implies for an arbitrary risk vector V
VaR1−γ(∥V ∥1) ⪯ VaR1−γ(∥Vdep∥1) (3.39)
(where f ⪯ g is defined as lim supγ→0
f(1−γ)
g(1−γ) ≤ 1 ). If the distribution of ∥V ∥1 has a density, then
the Conditional Tail Expectation CoTE1−γ(∥V ∥1) from Definition 2.1 coincides with what is
introduced as Tail Value-at-Risk TVaR1-γ(∥V ∥1) in [3].
If ∥V ∥1 has infinite variance corresponding to α ∈ (1,2], we get from Theorem 2.1 in [3] the
inequality VaR1−γ(∥V ∥1) ≤ CoTE1−γ(∥V ∥1), which obviously implies also
VaR1−γ(∥V ∥1) ⪯ CoTE1−γ(∥Vdep∥1).
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If we combine this with the Karamata asymptotic
CoTE1−γ(∥Vdep∥1) ∼ α
α − 1VaR1−γ(∥Vdep∥),
this gives
VaR1−γ(∥V ∥1) ⪯ α
α − 1VaR1−γ(∥Vdep∥1),
which is in the light of (3.39) not an optimal bound as α
α−1
> 1 for α > 1.
If ∥V ∥1 has finite variance, corresponding to α > 2, Theorem 3.2 of [3] gives the inequality
VaR1−γ(∥V ∥1) ≤min{µ + s√(1 − γ)/γ,CoTE1−γ(∥Vdep∥1)}
with µ = E∥V ∥1 and s2 = Var∥V ∥1. Since γ−1/α ⪯ √(1 − γ)/γ as γ → 0, this also is no optimal
bound compared to (3.39).
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